This paper deals with application of game theory model to insurance market. We observed a form of mutual insurance in conditions of full and partial information obtained by insurance buyers. First part of the paper defines the model of non-cooperative game, followed by principles of optimality, types of stability and equilibrium. Here, model of non-cooperative game has been analyzed under the assumption that players are fully informed. Situation where players are only partially informed requires model which takes into account decision process and analysis of every player's actions. This analysis requires that hierarchical structure among players need to be established. Model of conflict situation, with established hierarchical structure with informational reflexivity, represent the model of reflexive game. We define that reflexive game model, followed by required conditions for which some strategy is informational equilibrium strategy. We then proceed to perform analysis of game theoretic application to mutual insurance model, with hierarchical structure in agent positioning, in conditions of both full and partial information obtained by the player, with the goal of finding equilibrium strategies.
INTRODUCTION
Development of game theory provided lots of opportunity to more accurately model variety of economic phenomena in observed system. First introduction of game theory to economic literature was trough papers by Cournot (1838) , Bertrand (1883) , and Edgeworth (1897). John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern (1944) in their "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" established the foundations of general game theory and confirmed possibility to analyze economic phenomena with game theory tools. John F. Nash (1950) introduced a concept of equilibrium outcome (equilibrium situation) as a method of resolving non-cooperative games.
Basic division of games in accordance to game theory is separation on cooperative and non-cooperative games. Theory of non-cooperative games starts with an assumption that the decision maker (player) is a rational individual that aspires to the best possible outcome (maximizing utility) in accordance with pre-defined rules. Contrary to that, theory of cooperative games starts with the group of players which form a coalition that acts as a decision maker. If the game is well defined, then it is precisely determined what a coalition can achieve, but without indications as to how the outcome can influence the coalition itself (Aumann, 1997) . So, theory of non-cooperative games is strategy oriented, and it explores the expected outcomes, or how are the outcomes reached among actions undertaken by players. Contrary to that, theory of cooperative games analyses outcomes directly, without analyzing the way they are achieved. Theory of non-cooperative games represents a micro approach, containing all the details of actions and outcomes, while theory of cooperative games goes for a macro approach, with analysis of all the possible outcomes that can be reached.
We direct attention of further analysis to models of non-cooperative games and aspects of micro analysis, as well as its application to modeling of mutual insurance. Theory of noncooperative games is a way to model and analyze situations in which optimal strategy for every player is dependent on his own actions, but also dependent on actions taken by other players. Most important characteristic of this theory is built on the fact that players should anticipate how others will act, in accordance to game rules and assumption of rationality. Under those, all players aspire to maximize their utility. During 70's, the focus of analysis was brought to information obtained by rational players as part of non-cooperative games. Important works include Selten (1965) on perfect information and Harsnayi (1967) on partial information. Following those, we have Selten (1975) on concept of equilibrium in extensive games with perfect information, and then Kreps and Wilson (1982) who expanded Selten's model with introduction of partial information on player's payouts. Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson in their experiment of finite game of repetition came to conclusion that players deviate from dominant strategies in some periods of the game, and they aspire to certain level of cooperation. Due to that they analyze repetition model with partial information.
Economic models that regard insurance markets published since early 60's (Borch, 1962 and Bühlmann, 1984) analyze interests of both sides: insurance sellers (insurance companies) and buyers. These models explore the issues with fairness, or Pareto optimality and market equilibrium. Bühlmann claims that insurance premiums depend not only on implied risks, but on market conditions as well. With that, standard actuary tools fail to account for that sort of dependency, and in order to fully include all contributing market interactions we need to develop new models for pricing insurance premiums. In addition to models mentioned, game theory models are being introduced, especially in situations when insurance companies include subadditive insurance premiums for independent risks. In such cases, individual players can protect their premiums by partaking in mutual insurance, rather than individual. These particular situations are being analyzed by Alegre and Claramunt (1995) . Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , in their seminal paper, introduce asymmetric information model where every insurant has private information about his state of nature. Insurer provides different contracts, thus providing screening of insurants whit unique separating equilibrium in which high risk insurants chose high risk contracts and vice versa. Picard (2009) further developed R-S model where insurer participate in an insurance as a form of mutual insurance. Moral hazard and adverse selection play important role in insurance and there are number of papers devoted to this area (Geoffard, Chiappori and Durand, 1999; Wambach, 2000; Mimramna and Wambach, 2010) . Power and Shubik (1998 Shubik ( , 2006 analyze the effect of insurants number and optimal number of reinsured agents, whereas Taksak and Zeng (2011) analyze disproportionate reinsurance.
NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES AND OPTIMALITY PRINCIPLE
Game theory models interaction between agents, with the main goal of finding the optimal set of rules (in a form of strategies) for each player. Interaction can be seen as some sort of a conflict in a market, where we have to define who the participants are and which are their pos-sible moves in order to acquire their goal. Every subject in a conflict situation has a set of possible choices -strategies, i.e. his moves in some interaction, or conflict situation that is modeled. Strategies define course of action for each subject in a game.
Depending on used strategies of players the game resolves with some value for each player, as a final "effect" of the interaction. In this setting, therefore, players cannot observe only their strategies, and maximize utility (like in a decision theory setting), and they have to take into account the effect of interaction among different agents. The class of games in which agents do not form coalitions are called non-cooperative games.
Let I be the set of all players. Every player i I  has a defined strategy set denoted as i X .
Strategy profile represents Cartesian product of strategy sets for every player
while with
: i H X ˇ we have a defined set of payoff functions for each player, assigning value to each combination of chosen strategies x X  from a strategy profile set. Normal form non-cooperative game is a defined as a system
Suppose that J is a subset of players, .
J I
 With J x we will denote subset of strategy space where all strategies of players j J  are defined. Let 
Strategy profile satisfying (5) and (6) is called Pareto optimal. Also, directly from definition of I-stabile profiles, if we have a strategy profile x X  for which
This conditions show that enhancing one player's payoff function we need to lower the payoff for some other player.
Another optimality principle for non-cooperative games, other than stability principle, is the equilibrium concept.
Definition 2
For a non-cooperative game G, strategy profile
 is called I-equilibrium if it does not exist any strategy profile y X  which strictly dominates
Any change in strategy for each player cannot provide better outcome than the one given by the achieved I-equilibrium. Nash equilibrium is achieved if for all players i I  and any strategy
Non-cooperative game theory models the situations in which the optimal solution for every player is conditional on other players' actions. The anticipation of other players' actions is imposed in game theoretic concept, with assumption that each player is rational and that there exist common knowledge about the rationality of all players, while all the players are maximizing their payoff functions.
Often, normal form game is not good enough to efficiently model economic interaction. Extensive form games are often used to model dynamic interaction between players. The extension form games are represented by player's action in a form of a tree. The elements of an extensive game are (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) :
(1) The set of players;
(2) The order of moves, i.e. who moves when; (3) What the players' choices are when they move; (4) The players' payoff as a function of the moves that were made; (5) What each player knows when he makes his choices; (6) The probability distribution over any exogenous events; Extension form game is defined as a system:
Informational structure of extensive form games provides partition of games into games with perfect and imperfect information. If each information set consists of just one node we consider that game to be a game with perfect information, while in other case we talk about the games with imperfect information. Strategy of a player then represents the description of possible actions depending in which information set he is located. 
. Strategy of a player can be viewed as a complete course of action for each of his infor-mation sets. It can be seen in a following manner -for each information set where they have a move, all the players provide a decision about their actions, and then we can suppose a computer takes into account these strategies and resolves the game. Strategies therefore represent a complete plan and define behavior of players for all information sets.
Extensive form games with perfect information defined with (8) can be transformed in normal form games where one node represents one possible strategy of a player in a normal form non-cooperative game.
Hierarchical games represent important class of extensive form games. This class is used to model situations where we have interaction between agents (as we mentioned which can be seen as a form of a conflict) with governing power of some player during this interaction. Twostage governing system of interaction can be defined as follows:
1. Governing (coordination) center 0 I -player with highest governing power (or player with first level governing power); 2. Players , 1,..., 
Vector Two stage governing system model of agents' interaction is a normal form game
...,
In a game defined by (9) Nash equilibrium exists if following conditions are satisfied:
is the solution of parametric linear programming problem (parameter be- 
Based on (10) we have that for all players i I , 1,..., i n  with lower governing power optimal strategy is the one satisfying that for all
stabile that is, enlarging the payoff value of one player with result with lower payoff value for other.
MODEL OF REFLEXIVE GAMES
Reflexive models are applicable in situation where we do not have knowledge about the level of players' information, and where players define their actions according to hierarchical structure imposed. In order to incorporate reflexive models in game theory it is required to define strategic and informational reflexivity. Strategic reflexivity represents the reasoning and the results of reasoning process of players regarding the principles and strategies of other players within the scope of their information set. At the same, players this process accredit as the result of strategic reflexivity. Therefore, strategic reflexivity is a process where we anticipate other players' action from possible set of actions. Informational reflexivity assumes reasoning process of players regarding principles and strategies of other players, but, unlike in strategic reflexivity does not impose actions based on this reasoning. Informational reflexivity is in correlation with a situation where there is lack of mutual information and their results are used together with strategic reflexivity (Novikov and Chkhartishvili, 2003a; Novikov and Chkhartishvili, 2003b ).
This level of reasoning requires hierarchical structure setting among players. This has been modeled with a class of extensive form dynamical games of hierarchical structure. Two stage governing system model of agents' interaction is defined and we showed that there exists Nash equilibrium in this setting.
Games of interaction between agents with a defined hierarchical structure between players with existing informational reflexivity are called reflexive games (Novikov and Chkhartishvili, (003a; Novikov, and Chkhartishvili, 2003b) . Psychological research about reflexive models by Lefebvre (1965) represent foundation for reflexive game models (see also Lefebrve, 2010) for detailed concept of reflexive games and their methodological background).
In a reflexive game setting every player models and anticipates other players' moves based on available information, i.e. every player chooses his action simulating interaction with a player from higher governing power level, and waiting for a same governing level players to choose their actions. Steady state, based on resulted strategies in a reflexive game setting represents informational equilibrium. Therefore, equilibrium in any reflexive game is dependent on an informational structure. Moreover, the change of informational structure leads to the change of an informational equilibrium. 
Continuus and convex payoff function i H for a player i after the realization of the game
represents all the information sets for all players.
Formal definition of reflexive games allows formalizing concept of informational equilibrium (Novikov, Chkhartishvili, 2003a) :
For all   strategy 
REFLEXIVE GAME MODEL OF A MUTUAL INSURANCE
Model of mutual insurance with a hierarchical structure of agents related to the probability of damage of the insured object is presented. We analyze the relation between insurants while paying premiums, and fund used for claims of insurants. We assume the same risk attitude of insurants (agents) and different probabilities of damage realization and different claim structure of agents.
The main goal of the model is to impose insurants reflexivity and their incomplete information. Identical risk attitude and perfect information would allow arbitrary (a priori defined) reallocation of collected claims between agents. But, adding incomplete information creates asymmetry allowing different payoffs of collectible claims i.e. different expect utilities for different agents.
be the set of insurant (or agents) who have signed a contract with an insurer. Every agent has an expected utility function In a perfect information setting, overall insurance premium is equal to
while overall expected claims that will be collected, denoted as H are therefore
With perfect information of all agents we have allocation of premiums toward the clients who had to collect the insurance, that is
Marko Backovic, Zoran Popovic, Mladen Stamenkovic / Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2016), 87-100 which is the equilibrium condition in a mutual insurance setting. This condition can be viewed as a zero-sum game model, as in our model insurance company works with zero profit margin and all the premiums are transferred to agents who have suffered damage of the insured object. Also, assume complete compensation of the damage,
With assumption (19) directly follows that expected value of claims H is equal to the expected value of the incurred damage:
With imposed rationality and directly from (18) and (20) we see that an agent i will be ready to pay a premium equal to
In order to have equality (21) satisfied, or to have every agent premium equal to the expected value of damage following two conditions need to be satisfied:  All individual insurance parameters need to be common knowledge to all agents;  All agents behave according to their own parameter values.
Failure of one of these conditions would imply that a rational agent cannot determine his premium as an expected value of the damage and equation (21) does not hold. Of course, these assumptions are far from realistic. What we need to take into the account is the information that insurants have about the probability of damage. What a potential insurant might represent as a probability might differ from the true value. Mechanism of control must be induced to take care about the validity of the presented parameters. Assume that agents can share their information about the probability . 
If the damage of the insured good happens, the claim that should be collected,  , 
Using (22) and (24) we obtain tains additional information about all parameters of insured cases. Its actions forces potential agents to sign the contract of mutual insurance as well as to uphold to true values of their parameters. Every agent abandoning the agreement provides greater fond for all the other agents. Furthermore, our model overcomes strict assumptions of similar models related to reflexive game, thus providing much realistic setting.
